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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Australian superannuation system
1
 has primarily had a “lump 
sum” approach to retirement, as distinct from a “replacement rate” or 
lifetime income stream approach.
2
 After all, superannuation in Australia 
is primarily a defined contribution (DC) system under which the retire-
ment benefit payable on retirement is a factor purely of the employee’s 
own contributions (and those made by employers on the employee’s be-
half) as increased by the net investment returns attributable to the em-
ployee, less tax. Like the United States, Australia is now realizing the 
limitations of a DC retirement system insofar as it relates the provision of 
reliable retirement income for a population with increasing life expectan-
cy. 
In Australia, the core DC retirement plan product is called an ac-
count-based pension. This is a bit of a misnomer because it is only a 
“pension” because the legislators decided to give it that name. It is really 
just a mutual fund account that allows retirees to draw out, usually via a 
regular payment, their retirement savings to live on. Withdrawals are tax-
free. Like in the United States, there is a minimum amount that must be 
drawn out each year to prevent perpetual exclusion of the balance from 
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 1. The superannuation system is Australia’s “second pillar” retirement plan or private pension 
system. 
 2. The lump-sum approach was adopted despite recommendations in the Final Report of the 
National Superannuation Committee of Inquiry (Hancock Report) in 1976 that there be a compulso-
ry National Superannuation Scheme that would involve a purchased pension. The Hancock Report 
recommended weekly payments available upon reaching age sixty-five based on a multiple of paid-
in contributions. The report was rejected by the Fraser government in 1979. A task force was then 
formed to examine occupational superannuation and participation by the union movement. In 1983, 
the Commonwealth Task Force on Occupational Superannuation recommended a regulatory frame-
work for the superannuation industry, proposals for vesting and preservation requirements, and 
proposals to encourage annuity purchase. COMMONWEALTH TASKFORCE ON OCCUPATIONAL 
SUPERANNUATION (AUSTRALIA), FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH TASK FORCE ON 
OCCUPATIONAL SUPERANNUATION, JANUARY 1983 (1982). 
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the taxation system. Unlike the United Kingdom, there is no limit to the 
amount that can be drawn out and hence no guarantee that the money 
will last. 
Unlike DC plans, defined benefit (DB) plans provide a benefit 
based typically on time served and a predetermined proportion of either 
career average or final salary. 
Towers Watson’s 2013 Global Pension Assets Study shows that DC 
assets represent about 45% of total pension assets globally but are grow-
ing at an annual rate of about 8%, compared to a 6.6% growth rate for 
DB assets.
3




So what is wrong with DC retirement plans? First and principally, 
the problem is that DC plans are not designed to produce a particular lev-
el of income in retirement, but just a terminal capital sum the size of 
which is subject to a range of uncertainties. Second, DC plans expose 
members to a much higher degree of risk than DB plans. Lastly, their 
individualized, rather than pooled, design can lead to a range of ineffi-
ciencies. The result is that DC plan contributors often fall short of their 
financial goals in retirement. According to the Organization for Econom-
ic Co-operation and Development (OECD), workers contributing a total 
of 10% to DC pension plans for 40 years only have a 53% chance of tar-
geting 70% of their final salary.
5
 At a 5% contribution rate, only 14% of 
retirees reach that target. 
DC plans often lack a clearly stated goal that allows contributors to 
measure their progress toward a secure retirement. There is a tendency 
for DC plans, particularly in compulsory systems, to set a goal of build-
ing up a lump sum. For most retirees, their lump sum is not inherently 
suited to ensuring financial security in retirement. Retirees find it diffi-
cult to estimate how much they can spend each year to fund a retirement 
of an indeterminate length. The Australian system makes sense of this 
difficulty by using averages: average length of retirement, average in-
vestment returns, and average rate of consumption. The trouble is that 
almost nobody has an “average” retirement. It is a highly individualized 
experience. 
                                                          
 3. Global Pensions Assets Study 2013, TOWERS WATSON, 37 (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.tower 
swatson.com/en-ZA/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2013/01/Global-Pensions-Asset-
Study-2013. 
 4. Id. 
 5. OECD, DESIGN AND DELIVERY OF DEFINED CONTRIBUTION (DC) PENSION SCHEMES—
POLICY CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2013) (U.K.), available at http://www.oecd.org/d 
af/fin/private-pensions/DCPensionDesignHighlights.pdf. 
2014] Defined Contribution Pension Plans  513 
Retirees face financial risks that are difficult to manage without 
specialized and sophisticated products. Central to the idea of a DC re-
tirement plan is the idea that asset allocation can address all of the needs 
of the retiree.
6
 In reality, there are risks facing retirees that are very diffi-
cult to ameliorate without using products that are specifically designed to 
deal with them. Such specialized products include a guarantee to protect 
against loss of capital or income, an indexed income stream to deal ex-
pressly with inflation, and a lifetime annuity to deal with longevity risk. 
All of these products involve some form of absorption of risk by inter-
mediaries external to the DC plan itself or by the plan sponsor using its 
own balance sheet. 
DC plans rest on a theory of consumer sovereignty. Success in a 
DC plan depends on the contributor making informed choices and 
demonstrating rational behavior. In the real world, information asym-
metry, issues with financial literacy, and innate behavioral biases, often 
make it hard for the consumer to achieve any degree of “sovereignty.” 
The result is a system heavily reliant on (potentially conflicted) agents. 
DC plans also tend be more expensive to run than DB plans. The 
individualization that is central to the operation of DC plans means that 
they cannot easily pool risk. DC plans, therefore, typically accept less 
risk and hence receive lower average returns, particularly after invest-
ment and administration expenses.
7
 
Lastly, in Australia there is no insurance scheme or government 
guarantee protecting DC plan members in the event of failure, except in 
the case of fraud where the government has discretion to compensate a 
plan to restore loss if it is in the public interest.
8
 
A successful and sustainable DC system must address the short-
comings of DC plans. A properly integrated retirement plan should seek 
to protect contributors from three key financial risks: inflation, deviation 
from expected outcome, and longevity. This Article considers the histor-
ical basis for the shift from DB to DC plans, the structural and practical 
shortcomings of DC plans, alternate pension models, and adjustments to 
existing retirement plan models that may offer a degree of protection to 
plan contributors. 
                                                          
 6. Following the famous modern portfolio theory and related concepts first outlined by Harry 
Markowitz in 1952. See Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952). 
 7. Beth Almeida & William B Fornia, A Better Bang for the Buck: The Economic Efficiencies 
of Defined Benefit Pension Plans, NAT’L INST. ON RETIREMENT SECURITY, 12 (Aug. 2008), 
http://www.nirsonline.org/storage/nirs/documents/Bang%20for%20the%20Buck%20Report.pdf. 
 8. Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) pt 23 (Austl.). 
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II. HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT OF DC PLANS 
How did DC plans become such a large part of the global pension 
system? DB plans were once widespread; employers contracted to pro-
vide a set amount (the “defined benefit”) for the duration of the employ-
ee’s retirement. However, governments and corporations around the 
world realized that retirement is expensive and making concrete promises 
about paying people in retirement is even more expensive. There are 
countless examples where the corporate pension plan became the core 
business—or brought down the business altogether—due to problems 
with funding liabilities.
9
 Many governments had the same experience, 
with Greece being the latest example. Systematically, it became obvious 
that taking on market, inflation, and longevity risk for people in retire-
ment was simply too risky other than for specialist asset managers. 
In the face of failing DB plans, DC seemed like the perfect solution. 
The risks inherent to retirement planning can be made to look like they 
are not even present in a DC plan. Because the typical DC plan does not 
aim to provide the retiree with a particular level of income, there is no 
target from which there can be a shortfall.
10
 
DC plans also allowed providers to transfer longevity risk
11
 to plan 
participants. While DB plans pool longevity risk, DC plans leave it to 
individual participants to deal with. This forces each contributor to self-
fund his retirement income. Contributors can be thought of as small in-
surance companies taking on their own longevity risk without the capital 
or the skills to do so. 
III. COMPARISON TO DB PLANS 
Amid the global trend of transitioning from DB to DC plans, there 
are many vocal proponents of one system over the other. Proponents of 
each system base their conclusions on different measures of success. The 
reality is that each system has its own advantages and disadvantages. 
Keith Ambachtsheer, a leading pension expert from Canada, made the 
point that both structures are flawed, and in his view, there is a desperate 
need for a fresh design for approaches within the pension sector.
12
 While 
                                                          
 9. See Ashby H. B. Monk & Gordon L. Clark, The “Crisis” in Defined Benefit Corporate 
Pension Liabilities: Current Solutions and Future Prospects, UNIV. OXFORD, 6 (June 8, 2006), 
http://economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/13760/1/wpg06-10.pdf. 
 10. This is, of course, a fiction because the present value of a person’s future cash flow needs 
in retirement, for a given standard of living, can be worked out to a reasonable degree of certainty 
using various assumptions. 
 11. Longevity risk is the financial risk of outliving your savings. 
 12. Keith Ambachtsheer, The Dysfunctional “DB vs. DC” Pensions Debate: Why and How to 
Move Beyond It, ROTMAN INT’L J. PENSION MGMT., Spring 2012, at 36. 
2014] Defined Contribution Pension Plans  515 
the economy may not be able to afford the promises made through a DB 
system, neither can the members of a DC plan take any real comfort from 
the building of assets without a specific goal for those assets. 
In considering whether or not DC plans are suitable for retirement 
income purposes, it is important to remember that both DB and DC sys-
tems are flawed. We should not be asking whether or not DC plans can 
replicate DB plan outcomes; rather, we should ask whether DC plans can 
deliver what their members require. That is, can DC plans deliver a relia-
ble stream of income in retirement to meet the needs of entire cohorts of 
retirees? 
Part of the problem with DC plans can be traced to the transition 
from DB to DC plans. The conversion from DB to DC required a calcu-
lation of a lump-sum amount that was the present-day equivalent of the 
future benefits that had already been accrued by the member. The meth-
od used to convert DB plan members to a DC plan has become the (de-
fault) objective of the DC plan. While the DB was focused on the benefit 
(the ultimate income payments), the DC metric now focuses on the dollar 
balance that is accrued. In general, DC plans focus on this target balance 
at retirement. Even in Australia, where the contribution rate is currently 
mandated as 9.25% of a salary, increasing to 12% by fiscal year 2022, 
the focus of the system is the balance at retirement, not what level of in-
come the retiree is going to need in retirement or how much reliable an-
nual income that balance can produce. The problem is that meeting this 
target balance at retirement does not in itself guarantee the retiree an ad-
equate income stream. A recent survey in the United States found that 
only 46% of workers have tried to calculate how much money they will 




A discussion of appropriate goals for a retirement income system 
must consider the evolution of the concept of retirement. Since Bismarck 
first introduced the idea of a pension for workers in the 1880s, conditions 
and expectations have changed. While the original pensions were intend-
ed as a reward for surviving military service, Bismarck introduced the 
concept that workers could still get paid if they stopped working due to 
old age. Workers became eligible for a pension at an initial age of seven-
                                                          
 13. Ruth Helman et al., The 2013 Retirement Confidence Survey: Perceived Savings Needs 
Outpace Reality for Many, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. (Issue Brief No. 324, Washington D.C.), 
Mar. 2013, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_03-13.No384.RCS.pdf. 
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ty years. Given the likely life expectancy
14
 of the era, Bismarck’s pen-
sion plan covered only a small proportion of the population. Improve-
ments in health, leading to increased longevity, have changed the concept 
of retirement. It is no longer a lucky few that will finish their life at lei-
sure, but it is the majority who expect to have a period of their lives in 
retirement where they will still be healthy and active. 
It is this expectation of a healthy, active period of leisure that a DC 
plan is required to meet. Central to the modern-day concept of retirement 
is the need for a regular income that covers the expenses of the active, 
passive, and frail stages of a retiree’s life.
15
 After referring to those dif-
fering requirements in a speech to the Association of Superannuation 
Funds of Australia annual conference in 2012,
16
 former Australian Prime 
Minister, the Hon. Paul Keating, made the point that Australia’s super-
annuation system, like many DC plans, was never designed to create in-
come in retirement, but instead was intended to provide a supplement for 
retirees. Given modern-day circumstances and expectations, the appro-
priate goal of a DC retirement plan should be the provision of an ade-
quate level of income, in conjunction with whatever social security is 
available, across the different stages of retirement. 
Considering the shortcomings of Australia’s current DC system, 
Keating posited an alternative where the public sector takes control of the 
longevity phase by running a funded DB scheme for the provision of a 
deferred lifetime annuity or something similar. With the government 
wearing the residual longevity risk of such a scheme, it does not sound 
like a real solution to the problem. Instead, adjustments to superannua-
tion should be considered so that it can retain its DC nature and yet de-
liver the required retirement income. Any approach to guarantee a person 
against a specific risk, or in this case the combination of longevity and 
inflation risks, will have a cost. One way to ensure that the cost can be 
managed sustainably is to use a price mechanism around the cost of that 
guarantee. This is a potential development in the DC framework that is 
explored further below. Before considering alternatives, however, it is 
                                                          
 14. By way of example, Australian life expectancies at birth in 1889 were 47.2 years for males. 
Australian Historical Population Statistics, Table 7.1: Life Expectancy at Birth by Sex, States and 
Territories, 1881 Onwards, AUSTL. BUREAU STAT. (Aug. 5, 2008), http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTA 
TS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/3105.0.65.0012008?OpenDocument (download data cube 7 labeled “Life 
Tables”). 
 15. Tim Higgins & Steven Roberts, Financial Wellbeing Actions and Concerns—Preliminary 
Findings from a Survey of Elderly Australians, INST. ACTUARIES AUSTRALIA (Apr. 2011), 
http://www.actuaries.asn.au/library/events/Conventions/2011/FinancialWellbeing-Paper.pdf. 
 16. See Paul J. Keating, We’re Living Longer and So Should Our Superannuation, CUFFLINKS 
(Feb. 23, 2013), http://cuffelinks.com.au/for-four-score-years-and-more-a-government-run-annuity-
scheme/. 
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necessary to consider traits of successful pension plans as well as the 
structural and practical flaws in the current DC system. 
V. GLOBAL APPROACHES 
To meet the objective of providing an adequate level of income 
across the various stages of retirement, DC plans must integrate several 
strategies. In June 2012, the OECD Working Party on Private Pensions 
issued a ten-point roadmap for the good design of DC pension plans, 
summarized as follows: 
1. Ensure the design of DC pension plans is internally coherent 
between the accumulation and payout phases, and with the 
overall pension system. 
2. Encourage people to enroll, to contribute, and contribute for 
long periods. 
3. Improve the design of incentives to save for retirement, particu-
larly where participation and contributions to DC pension plans 
are voluntary. 
4. Promote low-cost retirement savings instruments. 
5. Establish appropriate default investment strategies while also 
providing choice between investment options with different risk 
profiles and investment horizons. 
6. Consider establishing default life-cycle investment strategies as 
a default option to protect people close to retirement against ex-
treme negative outcomes. 
7. For the payout phase, encourage annuitization as a protection 
against longevity risk. 
8. Promote the supply of annuities and cost-efficient competition 
in the annuity market. 
9. Develop appropriate information and risk-hedging instruments 
to facilitate dealing with longevity risk. 
10. Ensure effective communication and address financial illiteracy 




Australia scores about six or seven out of ten on these measures, 
with the key deficiencies being in the payout phase. This does not mean 
that the Australian system is broken, just that it has a way to go in its 
evolution. Australia, like other countries that rely heavily on DC plans, is 
                                                          
17. OECD, PENSIONS OUTLOOK (2012). 
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partway down the track of turning a lump-sum DC savings system into a 
retirement income system. 
VI. SIMILAR SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the United States, as in Australia, DC plans are widely used and 
are often inadequate for the needs of retirees. 401(k) plans, popular DC 
plans that have been operating in the United States since the early 1980s, 
were only ever intended as a lump sum supplement, not to provide re-
tirement income streams.
18
 The contribution cap, currently $17,500 per 
annum, and lack of compulsion—employee participation is voluntary—
mean 401(k)s are generally incapable of providing the main source of 
retirement income. A typical household where the head was aged fifty-
five to sixty-four had only $42,000 in a 401(k)-like plan in 2010, accord-
ing to a recent report.
19
 
As in Australia, some critics of DC plans in the United States pro-
pose an increased government role. Teresa Ghilarducci,
20
 a U.S. academ-
ic, describes 401(k) plans as a “failed experiment”
21
 and advocates a 
government scheme that would guarantee a rate of inflation, plus 3% in 
retirement.
22
 However, a rosier picture is painted by the mutual fund in-
dustry; the Investment Company Institute titled its 2012 report The Suc-
cess of the U.S. Retirement System.
23
 
Despite conflicting views of the 401(k) system in general, some DC 
plans in the United States are highly evolved. The Thrift Savings Plan 
(TSP) is a DC plan for civilians who are, or were, employed by the gov-
ernment and for members of the uniformed services. The TSP has around 
$300 billion in net assets, with approximately 4.5 million members. TSP 
uses a passive management strategy (currently using BlackRock as asset 
manager) by investing in various U.S. and global equity indices and in 
                                                          
 18. The common way of describing popular, but non-mandatory, tax-deferred workplace DC 
pension plan accounts. 
 19. Alicia H. Munnell, 401(k) Plans in 2010: An Update from the SCF, CTR. RETIREMENT RES. 
BOSTON COLL., July 2012, at 1, available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/IB_12-13-
508.pdf. 
 20. Teresa Ghilarducci is the Irene and Bernard L. Schwartz Chair of Economic Policy in the 
Department of Economics at The New School for Social Research in New York. 
 21. Teresa Ghilarducci, Why the 401(k) Is a “Failed Experiment,” PBS FRONTLINE (Apr. 23, 
2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial-crisis/retirement-gamb 
le/teresa-ghilarducci-why-the-401k-is-a-failed-experiment/. 
 22. Guaranteeing Retirement Income, SCHWARTZ CTR. ECON. POL’Y ANALYSIS BLOG (Oct. 6, 
2013, 3:53 PM), http://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/index.php/guaranteeing-retirement-
income. 
 23. PETER BRADY, KIMBERLY BURHAM & SARAH HOLDEN, INV. CO. INST., THE SUCCESS OF 
THE U.S. RETIREMENT SYSTEM (2012), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_12_success_ retire-
ment.pdf. 
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fixed interest. The TSP charges ultra-low fees to its members, being 
around 2.5 basis points (i.e., 0.025%) a year. 
Even with these strengths, the TSP falls down where most DC 
funds do in that it does not provide a pension in retirement, but only a 
lump sum that either has to be judiciously drawn down for consumption 
or separately transformed into a lifetime income stream via an intermedi-
ation with a third party (e.g., a life insurance company). In other words, 
the TSP suffers from the existential criticism of DC plans: it is a savings 
plan, as its name suggests, and not a retirement plan. 
VII. “WEALTH MANAGEMENT” CONCEPTION OF THE RETIREMENT 
CHALLENGE 
Another way of approaching the problem with DC plans is to say 
that they essentially flow from a conception of the retirement challenge 
as one of “wealth management.” The justification for the wealth man-
agement approach is that the average person will spend a long time in 
retirement and thus needs exposure to growth assets. Retirement, howev-
er, is about creating spendable income and managing some specific risks 
that are more acute in retirement: inflation, longevity risk, and market 
risk. Wealth management ignores the impact of volatility in retirement. A 
7.5% return with a standard deviation of 20% a year gives a retiree the 
same outcome as a constant return of 5.9%. DC plans spend too much 
time chasing the more volatile return in retirement. Interestingly, this is 
not what retirees actually want. Recent research carried out by National 




Steering the financial services industry in Australia and elsewhere 
away from this wealth management paradigm will involve a big change 
in attitude. Using the idea often attributed to Peter Drucker that “what is 
measured improves,”
25
 the DC industry does not know how to measure 
success in retirement. Despite retirees’ desire for low risk, the industry is 
still using league tables of the highest (non-risk adjusted) investment re-
turns to measure a good retirement plan. Following Drucker’s logic, we 
must work out a better way of measuring a good outcome in retirement, 
and then we can start managing for those outcomes. 
                                                          
 24. NAT’L SENIORS AUSTL. & CHALLENGER, RETIREES’ NEEDS AND THEIR (IN)TOLERANCE 
FOR RISK (2013), available at http://nationalseniors.com.au/sites/default/files/Retirees_Needs_Tolera 
nce_For_Risk.pdf. 
 25. Peter F. Drucker (1909–2005) was an Austrian-born management consultant.  
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VIII. SUCCESS AND FAILURE 
The traditional goal of a DC plan is to accumulate as many assets as 
possible, with minimal outgoings and an optimal level of volatility, to 
create the largest possible pool of savings. This provides a clear success 
measure—the investment return performance league table—and also 
clear options to improve the ultimate outcome, including asset allocation, 
saving more, reducing fees, minimizing taxes, and contributing (work-
ing) for longer, right down to the typical competition to get better in-
vestment returns. The financial services industry is well accustomed to 
working in this paradigm.
26
 
The goal for retirees, however, is not to accumulate the largest pool 
of savings at retirement, but to have income that meets their needs during 
retirement. In retirement, typically, there are four forms of expenditure to 
plan for: 
1. Everyday living costs, which require predictable and regular 
cash flows; 
2. Discretionary, emergency or otherwise, “lumpy” expenditures; 
3. Expenditure beyond life expectancy, which itself is only an ex-
pectation based on averages; and 
4. Bequests to the next generation. 
 
In addition, during retirement there are increasing needs around the li-
quidity and security of the investments to address both increased loss 
aversion and also the fact that the retiree is living off the portfolio. From 




Measuring success in DC plans is more complicated than simply 
measuring the sum accumulated at retirement. Sequencing risk
28
 will 
produce some situations where higher investment returns fail to deliver 
the objectives, while lower returns deliver a financially successful re-
tirement because losses are avoided and compounding of capital contin-
                                                          
 26. See Jason S. Stock, William F. Sharpe & John G. Watson, The 4% Rule—At What Price?, 7 
J. INVESTMENT MGMT. 31 (2009) (discussing the different costs associated with failure and the sur-
plus with success for a retiree following a simple plan). 
 27. A discussion of some of these objectives in an Australian context can be found in Russell 
Investments, Retirement Solutions I: Gaps in the State of the Art, RUSSELL (Apr. 2012), http://www. 
russell.com/AU/institutions/our-research/russell-research/video.asp?height=470&width=640. 
 28. Sequencing risk arises because accumulating savings is path dependent. The path or se-
quence of investment returns can have a dramatic effect on the eventual amount saved. For this 
reason, two retirees making exactly the same contributions can have had the same overall average 
investment returns over their lifetime, but end up with very different balances. 
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ues to occur.
29
 The complexity of measuring success in DC plans may be 
a key factor in the difficulty the Australian super industry is experiencing 
in meeting the challenges presented. 
IX. RETIREE BEHAVIOR 
A further challenge to DC plans is that their success is dependent 
upon retirees making sound financial choices. When people consider an 
immediate good (e.g., more spending) against a potential future negative 
(e.g., running out of money), all the evidence points to poor choices be-
ing made because of people’s internal framing mechanisms. People tend 
to apply far too high a discount rate to the value of future income. 
Additionally, DC retirement plans demand that retirees make com-
plex financial decisions that they are often poorly prepared to make. It is 
a curious feature of Australia’s superannuation system that a person can 
spend her working life in a default retirement plan and then, at retire-
ment, be required to make complex decisions about the sustainability of 
savings, inflation and the future value of money, investment risk, and 
budgeting without a regular wage.
30
 
The complexity of the decisions that retirees must make, along with 
other behavioral issues that people exhibit when dealing with the finan-
cial aspects of retirement,
31
 highlights the need to have a more rigorous 
approach either to the design of retirement products into which DC plan 
savings are invested or to advice about those products. 
X. PRODUCT SHORTCOMINGS: ADDITIONAL BURDEN ON THE SYSTEM 
Just as the pure DC model—where there is no intermediation or in-
surance of risks in retirement—places an undue burden on plan contribu-
tors, it also places a disproportionate burden on plans and advisers. In the 
pure DC model, advisers must make difficult and complex assessments 
about the durability of retirees’ savings and the ultimate outcomes they 
are likely to experience. How long a retiree’s savings might last depends 
on assumptions about market returns, longevity, and the spending budg-
                                                          
 29. Stock, Sharpe & Watson, supra note 26, at 39 fig.1 (providing a graphical representation). 
 30. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-400, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING: 
ENSURING INCOME THROUGHOUT RETIREMENT REQUIRES DIFFICULT CHOICES (2011), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/319385.pdf. 
 31. See Olivia Mitchell & Stephen Utkus, Lesson from Behavioural Finance for Retirement 
Plan Design, (Pension Research Council Working Paper No. 2003-6, 2003), available at 
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/03/0334.pdf (providing background to some of the issues); 
see also Shlomo Benartzi, Behavioral Finance and the Post-Retirement Crisis, ALLIANZ AMERICA 
(Apr. 29, 2010), http://befi.allianzgi.com/en/Publications/Documents/allianz-dol-rfi-response.pdf. 
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eted for in the retirement plan. These are complex matters and require 
very individualized attention. 
Recent reforms to the superannuation system in Australia, i.e., 
FOFA and Stronger Super,
32
 do not include any changes that are directed 
towards the retirement phase. Despite being an almost universal retire-
ment product in Australia, the account-based pension fails to deal with 
the three key risks facing retirees: (1) inflation; (2) longevity risk; and (3) 
market risk, including sequencing risk. Typically, the superannuation 
system exposes retirees to excessive volatility and uncertainty about the 
durability of their savings and how much sustainable spending cash flow 
they can expect in retirement. It therefore remains the case that advisers 
are often unwittingly “carrying the can” for poor retirement product de-
sign. Additionally, advisers today typically undertake a risk-profiling 
process rather than a goals-based approach.
33
 The limitations inherent in 
the risk-profiling process compound the burden on plans and advisers. 
So long as the Australian regulatory system leaves it up to the mar-
ket to design financial products and relies on disclosure alone to regulate 
them, a great deal of additional pressure will continue to be placed on the 
system to ensure that retirees understand the risks they face in retirement. 
As the so-called “shadow shop” survey into retirement advice conducted 
by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) in 
2012 showed,
34
 the fallout from this policy setting is felt by a significant 
proportion of clients (44%) who, according to the survey results, were 
not advised about how long their retirement savings were going to last.
35
 
The lack of information among clients should be taken not so much as a 
                                                          
 32 . Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial Advice) Act 2012 (Cth) 
(Austl.); Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice Measures) Act 2012 (Cth) 
(Austl.); see also Super System Review, AUSTRALIAN GOV., http://www.supersystemreview.gov.au/ 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2013) (package of measures arising out of the Super System Review of 2010); 
Stronger Support, TREASURY, http://strongersuper.treasury.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=hom 
e.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2013) (Austl.) (Australian government responding with its Stronger Super 
reforms as a result of package of measures arising out of the Super System Review of 2010). 
 33. “Risk profiling” is a process where investors are asked a series of questions to gauge their 
appetite for investment risk. 
 34. AUSTL. SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, REPORT 279: SHADOW SHOPPING STUDY OF RETIREMENT 
ADVICE (2012), available at https://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/rep279-
published-27-March-2012.pdf/$file/rep279-published-27-March-2012.pdf. 
 35. 12-55MR ASIC Releases Full Report on Retirement Advice Shadow Shopping Research, 
AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVESTMENTS COMMISSION (Mar. 27, 2012), https://www.asic.gov.au/asic/ 
asic.nsf/byheadline/12-55MR+ASIC+releases+full+report+on+retirement+advice+shadow+shoppin 
g+research?openDocument. 
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XI. MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY HAS A TIME FRAME LONGER        
THAN RETIREMENT 
Although the design of DC plans is based largely on the concepts of 
Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), the use of MPT creates difficulties 
when dealing with retirement. The investment techniques studied and 
practised by managers of DC assets have their roots in MPT, which was 




 in the 1950–60s. The 
results of MPT require a long-horizon investor that does not require any 
cash flows in the near term, unlike a retiree in the spending phase. Mar-
kowitz himself acknowledged this caveat in 1991 when he noted that 




Generating a sustainable retirement income stream requires atten-
tion to three phases of financial planning, but MPT addresses only one. 
MPT deals only with the middle investment phase. The first stage is that 
of saving, which in Australia is targeted through the compulsory nature 
of superannuation contributions. The third stage is that of spending in 
retirement. The spending stage should be about determining a suitable 
drawdown strategy that will provide the cash flow that is expected after 
years of saving and investing. The spending stage is not about investing 
to access long-term average returns of various asset classes, as required 
by MPT. Reaping long-term average returns is largely the privilege of 
accumulators, even though retirees are in retirement for a long time. Be-
cause of their cash flow needs and their inability to recover from losses, 
most retirees have shorter time horizons for their retirement savings than 
those posited by MPT. 
XII. THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL LITERACY AND EDUCATION 
Additional financial literacy, while useful, is not the solution to the 
shortcomings in DC plans. Most Western democracies devote some level 
                                                          
 36. How long retirement capital will last at an assumed spending rate is a very difficult ques-
tion. See Michael S. Finke, Wade D. Pfau & David Blanchett, The 4 Percent Rule Is Not Safe in a 
Low-Yield World, J. FIN. PLANNING, June 2013, at 44, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pape 
rs.cfm?abstract_id=2201323. 
 37. See Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952). 
 38. See William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Con-
ditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964). 
 39. Harry M. Markowitz, Individual Versus Institutional Investing, 1 FIN. SERVS. REV. 1, 1–8 
(1991). 
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of resources to fostering financial literacy. They are forced to do this be-
cause so many complex financial decisions have been devolved to the 
general populace. Australian consumers struggle with opaque and com-
plex mobile phone plans; analyzing the comparative cost of their utilities; 
complex financial products; and later in life, the complexities of health 
care, social security, and aged care rules. 
The National Financial Literacy Strategy was launched in 2011 to 
improve the financial literacy of Australians.
40
 Likewise, ASIC estab-
lished a MoneySmart website in 2011 to provide people with guidance 
on how best to handle their finances.
41
 The site offers tips on how to deal 
financially with major life events like losing a job, having a baby, buying 
a home, or retiring. Other government agencies, major financial institu-
tions, and not-for-profit organizations also make efforts in financial liter-
acy. 
While all of these services are well intentioned and, some would 
say, essential in a first world economy like Australia, they all suffer from 
the same fundamental problems: the sheer scale of the information 
asymmetries involved, investor behavior flaws, and generally low levels 
of literacy and numeracy in the community.
42
 A leading Australian sur-
vey into adult literacy and life skills showed that around half the adult 
population lacked functional literacy and numeracy skills to the point 
where they were unable to participate in a knowledge-based economy.
43
 
These are major impediments to the worthy aim of having the entire 
population fully financially literate. 
Lauren Willis from the University of Pennsylvania sums up the is-
sue of financial literacy neatly in her paper Against Financial-Literacy 
Education.
44
 She advocates introducing policies that support good finan-
cial outcomes for consumers rather than increasing the financial educa-
tion of a generally disengaged general public—a task she views as im-
possible. 
                                                          
 40. AUSTL. SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, REPORT 229: NATIONAL FINANCIAL LITERACY STRATEGY 
(2011), available at http://www.financialliteracy.gov.au/media/218312/national-financial -literacy-
strategy.pdf. 
 41. MONEYSMART, https://www.moneysmart.gov.au/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2013). 
 42. AUSTRL. SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, REPORT 230: FINANCIAL LITERACY AND BEHAVIOURAL 
CHANGE (2011), available at http://www.financialliteracy.gov.au/media/218309/fina ncial-literacy-
and-behavioural-change.pdf. 
 43. AUSTL. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, ADULT LITERACY AND LIFE SKILLS SURVEY, SUMMARY 
RESULTS (2006), available at http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/42 
28.0Main%20Features22006%20(Reissue)?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=4228.0&is
sue=2006%20(Reissue)&num=&view=. 
 44. Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197 (2008), 
available at http://www.law.uiowa.edu/documents/ilr/willis.pdf. 
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The DC model pushes risk and decision making down to the indi-
vidual level. As a result, in a compulsory system like Australia’s, there is 
a high degree of cognitive and other inefficiencies involved. Take driving 
cars as an example. Because automobiles provide individualized 
transport, we all need to be trained and licensed to operate one. This is 
not so of pensions. Who thought it was a good idea to make an entire 
population become investment experts? Global pension expert Don Ezra 
explains the flaw in this approach in a 2009 article: 
There is zero chance of making the average person an investment 
expert. This is simply common sense, as we don’t launch healthcare 
plans intending to educate employees to be their own doctors or 
surgeons. We use qualified experts. If we need to fly from point A 
to point B, we don’t learn to fly our own planes. We use qualified 
experts. The average person will never become a doctor, surgeon, 
pilot[,] or engineer by reading pamphlets. Just as the average person 
will also never become an investment expert that way.
45
 
While increasing financial literacy and engagement with compulso-
ry superannuation are worthy aims, policies that rely on either of these as 
a pre-condition to some other outcome are highly unlikely to be success-
ful. Calls for greater levels of financial literacy so that ordinary people 
will be able to cope with ever-increasing levels of financial complexity 
should be resisted. 
XIII. OTHER MODELS 
In several countries (notably Denmark, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States), there has been quite a bit of recent 
thought about modifying the pure DC model so that DC looks more like 
DB. What the new model actually looks like can depend on whether it is 
a DC plan morphing or already a DB plan looking to become more sus-
tainable. Three emerging models are the collective DC plan, the “defined 
ambition” plan, and the “target date” (or “lifecycle”) plan. 
A. Collective DC Plans 
Under collective DC (CDC) plans found in Denmark and the Neth-
erlands, the employer pays a fixed rate of contributions and the risks are 
shared between members. There is an expected or target benefit, but it is 
not guaranteed. Investing is done on a “with profits” basis, smoothing 
                                                          
 45. Don Ezra, Three Certainties and a Speculation: Reflections of a Pension Professional, 2 
ROTMAN INT’L J. PENSION MGMT., Spring 2009, at 52, 53 (emphasis removed), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1408698&download=yes. 
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outcomes across all members. The actual pension benefit paid depends 
on the funding level of the plan at the relevant time. Changing the rate of 
indexation of pensions year-on-year is often used as a risk-sharing lever 
if the plan suffers poor investment returns. Importantly, this model over-
comes a lot of the negatives of the individualization of DC. Investment 
risk is pooled across the plan so it can stay invested in higher risk assets 
and earn an illiquidity premium, even in respect of members approaching 
retirement. Also, there are greater economies of scale and efficiencies 
available under the CDC model. 
The weakness of CDC plans lies in their ambiguity (what is the 
promise exactly?) and intergenerational equity issues (is one generation 
funding another?). In addition, the CDC model depends for its success on 
cultural norms of solidarity and collectivism that are not sufficiently em-
bedded in most Western societies. 
B. Defined Ambition 
The Netherlands has decided that the DB system is no longer sus-
tainable
46
 and is instead implementing defined ambition (DA) pension 
plans from 2015. DA plans are also being discussed in the United King-
dom. The central idea with DA is to replace the guarantee inherent in DB 
with so-called “soft real rights” that are adjusted annually for achieved 
real investment returns and longevity experience.  
DA aims to combine two competing needs: employers want pre-
dictable pension costs, and members want predictable outcomes. There 
are various DA models under consideration. A typical DA plan involves 
sharing longevity risk and investment risk between employers, members, 
and insurers. Market shocks are smoothed over a long period (e.g., ten 
years) before they actually hit pension income. 
A key reason for choosing a DA model over a DC model is the 
Dutch concern for intergenerational risk sharing and notion of “solidari-
ty.” The Netherlands also found the lack of a retirement income target in 
pure DC to be inadequate. 
In moving from the pure DB model towards a DA model, the Dutch 
are trading off the nominal guarantee in favor of an indexed (i.e., real) 
pension, but conditional on investment performance. The target pension 
is indexed each year and adjusted up or down based on realized invest-
                                                          
 46. Kees Pieter Goudswaard, Roel Maria Wilhelmus Jozef Beetsma, Theo E. Nijman & Paul 
Schnabel, Report of the Committee Sustainability Supplementary Pension Contracts (Toekom-
stbestendigheid Aanvullende Pensioenregelingen), LIEDEN UNIV. (Jan. 20, 2010), 
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ment returns. Longevity experience is also tested each year, and any nec-
essary adjustments made. 
There are other variations in DA models, depending on the direc-
tion in which a plan is moving (i.e., from DB to DA or vice versa): 
 DB to DA perspective 
The first step away from a pure DB plan is to soften the promise. 
By changing the rules so that when employees leave they do not remain 
as inactive members, the “pot” crystallizes to DC, which is portable. 
Then, there is no longevity risk for the plan in relation to the departed 
employee. 
 DC to DA perspective 
A shift from a DC model to a DA model can sometimes mean 
CDC. Other options are a simple “money-back” guarantee added to a DC 
plan, bulk-purchased annuities, or smoothing. These ideas are sometimes 
described as “DC Plus.” 
C. Target Date/Lifecycle Funds 
Much has been written on the subject of target date, or lifecycle, 
funds, both positive and negative. A fund that takes over the asset alloca-
tion decisions, aims to tailor an asset allocation based on the age of the 
member (and possibly other factors), and has the aim of delivering a bet-
ter retirement outcome certainly sounds like a worthy idea. The key chal-
lenge in this approach has been to find a solution that can be implement-
ed en masse. Products popularized in the United States have had some 
success in reducing exposure to market risk near retirement. On the other 
hand, it has been argued that there is an arbitrary reduction in exposure to 
the market that actually increases the risk of income failing to meet the 
needs of investors in these products.
47
 
There is a need to extend the factors beyond simply age or invest-
ment horizon to better target the desired outcome. The typical funds fall 
into the same trap as other DC approaches by focusing on the balance at 
a particular retirement date instead of delivering the required stream of 
income over a whole retirement. 
                                                          
 47. See Anup Basu, Alistair Byrnes & Michael E. Drew, Dynamic Lifecycle Strategies for 
Target Date Retirement Funds, (Griffith Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 2009-02, 2009), available at 
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XIV. ADJUSTMENTS TO EXISTING SETTINGS 
Rather than seek entirely new models, several proposed adjustments 
to existing pension settings appear promising. Potential adjustments in-
clude partial re-intermediation; system-wide guarantees; higher levels of 
financial literacy and engagement; annuity outcome targeting; and mass-
scale individualized DC plans. 
A. Partial Re-Intermediation—the “DB-ization” of DC 
Not every DB plan that ever existed has failed. That is, there are 
DB plans that have been, and still are, run effectively to deliver the in-
come that is required for their retired members.
48
 This demonstrates that 
it is possible for a well managed plan to provide a defined benefit out-
come. An alternative for the evolution of DC plans is to recognize the 
skills used in successfully managing DB plans and have third parties uti-
lize these skills to deliver a guaranteed income for DC plan retirees. 
This partial “re-intermediation” would not be without risk altogeth-
er, but it should be possible to have experts in the management of bal-
ance sheets (i.e., life insurance companies) provide the guaranteed in-
come as an adjunct to the DC-based accumulation model. The use of ex-
pert managers stands in contrast to traditional corporate DB plans where 
every employer needs to have skills in managing assets and liabilities in 
order to deliver the DB outcomes. The twist is that the benefit would be 
defined towards the end of the DC accumulation phase, rather than at the 
start. 
The partial re-intermediation approach would take the risk away 
from the employer who, as sponsor of the traditional DB plan, was re-
sponsible for managing some or all of the investment risks of the pension 
plan, depending on the strength of the promise. For employees, the par-
tial re-intermediation approach puts a third party in charge of managing 
their risks. For some, this will be an advantage, but for most there will be 
additional costs to ensure that the promise can be delivered. Additional 
costs would include the cost of the capital that would be required to back 
the payment of any promises. 
B. A Role for More Universal Guarantees? 
Another potential adjustment to existing settings is a system-wide 
guarantee. For example, Swiss and German funds incorporate system-
wide guarantees of various types to support them. Switzerland currently 
has a 2% minimum investment return guarantee. In the future, it is pro-
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posed that the rate be linked to the average market yield on seven-year 
Swiss government debt. German funds must offer a guarantee that, in 
nominal terms, members will have their contributions available at retire-
ment. In other words, the nominal capital of contributors is protected. 
System-wide guarantees are also under consideration in the United 
Kingdom. In 2012, the U.K. Pensions Minister, Steve Webb, started a 
conversation about so-called “money-safe” pensions where members of 
workplace DC plans could pay for the security of at least getting their 
contributions back when they retire. This was a forerunner to the release 




The OECD, in a recent paper, estimated that the median discounted 
sum of fees payable for a nominal guarantee of capital would equal a 
total of 1.28% of an average retirement lump sum at age sixty-five. The 
Swiss-style guarantee would involve a median discounted sum of fees 
payable of 4.98%, and a real, as opposed to nominal, guarantee of capital 
would cost 5.49%.
50
 These seem like quite reasonable amounts and might 
be attractive to some members. 
C. Annuity Outcome Targeting 
1. National Employment Savings Trust 
The United Kingdom recently established the National Employment 
Savings Trust (NEST), a default DC plan. Under NEST, when members 
near retirement age, they move into what is known as the consolidation 
phase, progressively moving out of return-seeking assets. Their asset al-
location shifts into a combination of annuity-tracking assets and money 
market investments preparing them for retirement, aiming primarily to 
manage “pension conversion risk.” This is the risk that pure DC plans 
leave unhedged: the risk that the lump sum accumulated cannot be con-
verted into a satisfactory retirement income stream. This is primarily an 
interest rate risk, being that if prevailing interest rates are low at the time 
of retirement, the discounted value of the future cash flows necessary to 
live at a particular standard of living for the rest of retirement is much 
higher than the accumulated lump sum. In this paper, this sort of ap-
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proach for the final stage of the accumulation phase of a DC plan is re-
ferred to as “annuity outcome targeting.” 
2. Switzerland 
In Switzerland, they go one step further. Swiss DC plans compel re-
tirees to convert their lump sums into income streams at a guaranteed 
rate, which is 7% for males and 6.95% for females. These are, most like-
ly, unsustainable rates, and there have been many debates about their 
reduction. 
3. Managed DC—Dimensional 
The approach taken by Dimensional Fund Advisors (Dimensional) 
and Professor Robert Merton is to target an appropriate level of income 
in retirement.
51
 Using a mathematical framework, Merton and Dimen-
sional set about maximizing the probability of being able to afford an 
annuity at retirement that provides a retiree with her desired level of 
spending.
52
 The critical focus of this approach is to target the cost of pur-
chasing an annuity at retirement that would provide the cash flows to 
meet the desired spending needs through retirement. The “managed” el-
ement of the process is the way in which outcomes that exceed the target 
are traded against a higher probability of achieving the target outcome. 
D. Mass-Scale Individualized DC Retirement Plans 
In Australia, QSuper is pioneering another approach. QSuper is 
pursuing the idea that a large DC plan can engage in a certain amount of 
mass customization by identifying defaults designed to suit most mem-
bers. Those not wanting to participate have the opportunity to opt out. 
Given the amount of personal information a plan is able to gather, in-
creasingly customized options can be tailored for members based first on 
age and account balance and, over time, other characteristics. The end 
result could be an increasingly tailored “default” experience as opposed 
to current arrangements that depend on the member making the decisions 
with or without an adviser. 
XV. PRIVATE SECTOR CAPACITY TO MANAGE LONGEVITY RISK 
One of the reasons that DB plans have been dismantled over the 
years has been the desire of private sector firms (and some public sector 
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groups) to avoid the problems of managing exposure to longevity risk, 
i.e., the financial consequences of outliving your savings. It is reasona-
ble, therefore, to question whether the private sector actually has the ca-
pacity to manage this risk. 
The key to the longevity risk capacity is simply the ability to earn a 
sufficient return on capital. Although pooling longevity risk diversifies a 
lot of the risk away, it does not guarantee an outcome for any individual 
member. What is required is the capital of a third party, typically a life 
insurer, to ensure that the promised payments are made. It is the respon-
sibility of that insurer and its regulators or supervisors to ensure the fol-
lowing: 
 It has enough capital to cope with extreme events (based on ro-
bust stress testing of asset values); 
 It projects average longevity accurately; and 
 The asset pool earns a sufficient return to pay a yield on the 
capital commensurate with the risk. 
 
Like most markets, the overall supply and demand for longevity 
risk protection will determine a suitable price. The market will be cleared 
as long as there is sufficient available capital for a reasonable supply of 
the protection. A model with low premiums and consistently high returns 
is one that is doomed to fail. 
The U.K. market has demonstrated that the private sector is pre-
pared to provide the capital to manage these products.
53
 In other markets, 
the key is to consider the cost of unexpected mortality improvements. 
Expected improvements should be reflected in the price in the same way 
that a life insurer without a compulsory market will adjust its pricing for 
the adverse selection effect. A life insurer will expect that customers who 
think they have a shorter than average life expectancy will not buy annui-
ties, so the longevity pool is distorted. The same is true of mortality im-
provements over time. 
XVI. CONCLUSION 
Compulsory DC super is an effective piece of public policy because 
it forces people to save. But it is a blunt tool that does not adequately 
meet the retirement needs of a majority of plan contributors. 
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The arbitrary selection of 9% or 12% of wages does not necessarily 
lead to the right amount or shape of sustainable cash flows in retirement. 
DC plans, like the Australian superannuation system, focus on the sum 
accumulated at retirement, not on the income stream necessary to meet 
the needs of retirees during a potentially long period of active, passive, 
and frail retirement. DC plans also place the burden of managing infla-
tion, market risk, and longevity risk on individual contributors regardless 
of the level of expertise contributors possess in financial matters. 
Plan trustees need to do more to get members focused on the real 
game: targeting a replacement rate of income and a guaranteed floor of 
inflation-adjusted income in retirement. Trustees need to work towards a 
properly integrated retirement income solution that hedges those three 
key risks. Several potential modifications, including partial re-
intermediation of DC plans via the use of life company balance sheets, 
annuity outcome targeting, and system-wide guarantees could improve 
the outcomes of DC super for the benefit of future generations of retirees. 
 
